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GATING THE GATEKEEPER: TAMRAZ v. 
LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO. AND THE EXPANSION 
OF DAUBERT REVIEWING AUTHORITY 
Abstract: On September 8, 2010, in Tamraz v. Lincoln Electric Co., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a neurologist’s expert tes-
timony was speculative and therefore inadmissible under Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit departed from 
its traditional deference to Rule 702 rulings of district court judges. This 
Comment argues that, although the Sixth Circuit’s decision is consistent 
with the requirements set forth by the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Sixth Circuit opened the door 
to more aggressive review of Daubert rulings. 
Introduction 
 In 2010, in Tamraz v. Lincoln Electric Co., a panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio.1 It decided that the district court abused its 
discretion by admitting a physician’s testimony that the plaintiff suf-
fered from manganese-induced parkinsonism.2 Specifically, the Sixth 
Circuit held that the physician’s testimony did not satisfy the require-
ment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that experts testify to 
“scientific knowledge.”3 In so doing, the court relied primarily on the 
1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals.4 Yet, in its effort to implement Daubert’s underlying policy, the 
Tamraz court may have exceeded its authority to review Rule 702 rul-
                                                                                                                      
1 620 F.3d 665, 667–68 (6th Cir. 2010). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 667; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 governs testimony by experts: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to . . . determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
4 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993); Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 677–78. 
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ings for abuse of discretion.5 As a result, Tamraz may open the door for 
other appellate courts to review the admission of expert testimony 
more aggressively.6 
 Part I of this Comment provides a background of the expert testi-
mony at issue in Tamraz and summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.7 
Then, Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s landmark Daubert ruling 
and subsequent cases interpreting the requirements of Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.8 Finally, Part III discusses the two competing 
interests in the case—adherence to the proper standard of review and 
guarding against inadmissible testimony.9 Further, it argues that, al-
though the Sixth Circuit likely applied Daubert correctly, the court’s de 
novo-like review may open the door for appellate courts to review Rule 
702 rulings more thoroughly, thus potentially usurping the gatekeeping 
role properly left to the trial court judge.10 
I. Tamraz: The Sixth Circuit Reverses on Daubert Grounds 
 Tamraz was selected as a test case of a consolidated group of ongo-
ing multidistrict litigation regarding welding fume products liability.11 
The plaintiff, Jeffrey Tamraz, worked as a welder for roughly twenty-five 
years, from 1979 to 2004.12 He began experiencing symptoms of park-
insonism around 2001.13 In 2004, he and his wife sued several manufac-
turers of welding supplies, alleging that their products caused his park-
insonism and that the manufacturers failed to warn him of the 
danger.14 The jury found for the plaintiffs on the strict liability and neg-
ligent failure to warn claims and awarded them $20.5 million in dam-
ages.15 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that appellate courts 
should review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence for abuse of 
discretion); Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 677–78. 
6 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 671–72. 
7 See infra notes 11–42 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 43–92 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 93–121 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 93–121 and accompanying text. 
11 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 667 (citing generally In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 
245 F.R.D. 279 (2007)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. His symptoms included tremors, drooling, a “masked face,” and impaired coor-
dination on his right side. Id. 
14 Id. The case went to trial on three theories of relief: strict liability failure to warn, 
negligent failure to warn, and fraud by concealment. Id. 
15 Id. The defendants filed motions to overturn the verdict under Rule 50 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50). The district court denied the 
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 The manufacturers appealed, arguing that the district court had 
abused its discretion by permitting the testimony of Dr. Walter Car-
lini.16 At trial, Dr. Carlini testified that the manufacturers’ products 
triggered “manganese-induced parkinsonism” in the plaintiff.17 Yet, 
according to the manufacturers, that testimony failed to meet the re-
quirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.18 
                                                                                                                     
 Parkinsonism encompasses a family of movement disorders that may 
have different causes and different, but overlapping, symptoms.19 The 
expert testimony in this case concerned two forms of parkinsonism—
Parkinson’s Disease and manganism.20 Parkinson’s Disease is the most 
common type of parkinsonism and its cause is often unknown.21 Man-
ganism is a form of parkinsonism defined by its cause—overexposure to 
manganese.22 
 In Tamraz, no one disputed that the plaintiff suffered from a form 
of parkinsonism.23 The dispute concerned the type and cause.24 Dr. 
Carlini testified that the plaintiff suffered from manganese-induced 
 
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, in which the defendants contended 
that there was insufficient evidence of overexposure to welding fumes to sustain the jury 
verdict. Tamraz v. BOC Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2008 WL 2796726, at *6–8, *25 
(N.D. Ohio July 18, 2008), rev’d, 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court explained 
that it examined much of the evidence regarding manganese exposure during its assess-
ment of admissibility under the standards set out in Daubert and found it sufficient. Id. at 
*8 & n.58 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-
CV-17000, 2005 WL 1868046, at *28–31 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2005)). 
16 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 667–68. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
19 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 668 (citing James Parkinson, An Essay on the Shaking Palsy (1817), 
reprinted in 14 J. Neuropsychiatry & Clinical Neurosciences 223, 223–36 (2002)). The 
symptoms of parkinsonism generally include tremors, instability, and slowness and rigidity 
of movement. Id. 
20 Id. at 668. 
21 See id. The typical Parkinson’s Disease patient suffers from a gradual loss of motor 
function and a tremor when at rest, both usually on one side of the body. Id. The disease is 
often described as being “idiopathic” because the medical community does not know what 
caused a given individual’s disease. Id. When the cause can be determined, however, the 
disease is often named by the cause—for example, “drug-induced parkinsonism” or “toxin-
induced parkinsonism.” Id. 
22 See id. The symptoms of manganism overlap with Parkinson’s Disease, but include an 
action tremor instead of a rest tremor, symmetry of symptoms, and a distinct gait known as 
a “cock walk.” Id. The typical manganism patient also suffers from neuron deterioration in 
a different part of the brain than the typical Parkinson’s Disease patient. Id. 
23 Id. at 669. 
24 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 669. 
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parkinsonism.25 Yet, the defendants contended that “factors other than 
exposure to manganese” caused the plaintiff’s parkinsonism.26 
 Dr. Carlini concluded that exposure to manganese may have trig-
gered the plaintiff’s parkinsonism by following a series of inferences.27 
First, Dr. Carlini noted that Tamraz was exposed to welding fumes that 
presumably contained manganese.28 Scientists have identified genetic 
factors that cause some forms of otherwise “idiopathic” Parkinson’s, 
and some literature has hypothesized that toxins combined with genet-
ics may cause other types of Parkinson’s Disease.29 Tamraz developed 
the symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease (but not those of manganism).30 
Thus, because manganese is known to cause manganism, Dr. Carlini 
hypothesized that manganese might trigger Parkinson’s Disease as 
well.31 Next, he theorized that Tamraz may be genetically predisposed 
to get Parkinson’s Disease (although Tamraz had no family history of 
it).32 Finally, Dr. Carlini concluded that manganese may have triggered 
these genes and caused Tamraz’s Parkinson’s Disease.33 
 On appeal, the circuit court found that this opinion exceeded the 
boundaries of Rule 702 and remanded the case for a new trial.34 Ac-
cording to the court, this testimony was no more than a hypothesis; it 
was not “knowledge” or “based upon sufficient facts or data” under 
Rule 702.35 First, the court observed that the doctor’s testimony was 
“speculative three times over.”36 Furthermore, the court noted that, 
even if it accepted that manganese could cause Parkinson’s Disease, that 
assumption did not conclusively show that it caused this plaintiff’s Park-
inson’s Disease.37 Although Dr. Carlini explained that he suspected that 
manganese caused Tamraz’s Parkinson’s Disease, evidenced by the dis-
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. at 670. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 670. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 678. 
35 Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702). 
36 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 670. The court explained that there were speculative jumps in 
the chain of causation. Id. Dr. Carlini described the literature hypothesizing a link between 
environmental toxins and genetic Parkinson’s as “theoretical.” Id. Dr. Carlini also con-
ceded that he knew of no studies finding a link between manganese and Parkinson’s dis-
ease. Id. In addition, he stated that “speculation” led him to guess that the plaintiff had an 
underlying predisposition to Parkinson’s Disease, even despite a lack of family history. Id. 
37 See id. at 670–71. 
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ease’s early onset, the court was not satisfied that this established the 
necessary foundation to show that manganese could cause Parkinson’s 
Disease and did cause it in this specific case.38 
 Thus, the circuit court concluded that nothing in Dr. Carlini’s tes-
timony established the sort of knowledge that Rule 702 requires.39 The 
court acknowledged that Rule 702 does not require certainty and that 
the district court enjoys broad discretion to determine what is admissi-
ble.40 Yet, the Sixth Circuit determined that Dr. Carlini’s testimony ex-
ceeded the bounds of Rule 702 because it contained not just one, but a 
string of speculations.41 Further, although Dr. Carlini’s hypothesis might 
eventually turn out to be correct, at the time of trial, it was nothing 
more than a hypothesis.42 
II. Daubert and Its Progeny: Excluding “Junk Science” 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Imposing a “Gatekeeping” Duty Through the 
Daubert Trilogy 
 Three cases establish the framework under which a party may chal-
lenge the admissibility of expert witness testimony.43 Previously, how-
ever, the 1923 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Frye v. United States, guided 
                                                                                                                      
38 See id. at 671. The court explained that roughly ten percent of people with Parkin-
son’s develop symptoms before age fifty; according to the court, this did not create an 
inference that something particularly unusual must have caused it in the plaintiff (who was 
between forty-one and forty-four at the onset of his symptoms). Id. 
39 Id.; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. Speculation is generally inadmissible. Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 
671; Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000) (“It is 
axiomatic that an expert, no matter how good his credentials, is not permitted to specu-
late.”). 
40 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 671–72 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146) (explaining that an ex-
pert purporting to make a finding “with a reasonable degree of medical certainty” is not 
alone sufficient to permit the admission of an opinion); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 
(explaining that the word “knowledge” in Rule 702 “connotes more than subjective belief 
or unsupported speculation”). 
41 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 672. 
42 Id. at 670, 677. In addition, the court reasoned that, as a policy matter, permitting 
testimony on speculation would be unfair. Id. at 677–78. The court noted that, in breast 
implant litigation—after billions of dollars in settlements and the bankruptcy of a major 
manufacturer—no evidence was found to tie breast implants to health problems. See id. at 
678 (citing Gina Kolata, Panel Confirms No Major Illness Tied to Implants, N.Y. Times, June 21, 
1999, at A1). 
43 David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to 
Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of 
Science, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (2003); see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
141–53 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–47 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 579–98 (1993). 
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the inquiry.44 Under the Frye test, testimony was properly admissible if it 
concerned a scientific subject that had gained “general acceptance.”45 
In 1975, however, Congress passed the Federal Rules of Evidence, in-
cluding Rule 702 that governed the admissibility of testimony concern-
ing “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”46 
 In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Supreme 
Court examined Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.47 Specifi-
cally, the Court considered whether the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence superseded the Frye test.48 The Daubert Court concluded 
that the Frye test was incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and that Rule 702 governed the admissibility of expert opinion in fed-
eral trials.49 
 Having concluded that Rule 702 governed the admission of expert 
testimony, the Court went on to clarify Rule 702’s requirements.50 Ulti-
mately, it concluded that the Rules require that an expert’s testimony be 
reliable and relevant, both in theory and methodology.51 First, the 
Court reasoned that Rule 702’s use of the word “scientific” required “a 
grounding in the methods and procedures of science,” and that “knowl-
edge” connoted “more than subjective belief or unsupported specula-
tion.”52 Therefore, to be admissible, testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation—that is, “good grounds.”53 Second, the testi-
mony must also be relevant to the case.54 Further, the Court concluded 
that Rule 702 requires trial court judges to act as gatekeepers to evaluate 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule as stated 
in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Rhoda B. Billings, Expert Testimony to Accommodate the Frye, 
Daubert, and Kumho Tire Standards of Admissibility, 54 Okla. L. Rev. 613, 615 (2001). 
45 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
46 Billings, supra note 44, at 615–16; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
47 509 U.S. at 579–98; Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
48 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585–86. 
49 Id. at 589; Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
50 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–98. 
51 See id. at 589; see also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential 
Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 939, 941–42 (1996) (explaining the two-
prong test required by Rule 702 in which the trial judge must assess both the reliability and 
methodology of the general scientific theory and the theory as applied to the facts of the 
case). 
52 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. “In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony per-
tain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.” Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 591. Rule 702 requires that the evidence “assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. This requirement has been 
described as a consideration of “fit” —that is, the evidence must have a valid scientific con-
nection to the pertinent inquiry. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Fenner, supra note 51, at 964. 
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whether proffered expert testimony meets these requirements.55 In ad-
dition, Daubert set out a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to assess 
the applicability of scientific expert testimony.56 The Court made it clear 
that this list was neither definitive nor exhaustive and that courts may 
consider these and other factors when appropriate.57 
                                                                                                                     
 Nonetheless, this relaxation of the Frye general acceptance stan-
dard was not meant to allow for the admission of all expert testimony.58 
Nor was the trial court’s gatekeeping function intended to replace the 
adversary system.59 Under Daubert, the Court observed that the tradi-
tional methods for attacking shaky but admissible evidence were still 
available, including “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.”60 
 Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions refined and clarified 
Daubert’s interpretation of Rule 702.61 In 1997, in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standard 
of review an appellate court should apply in reviewing a decision to 
admit or exclude expert testimony.62 The Court held that the proper 
standard for review of evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.63 Two 
years later, in 1999, the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 
provided further guidance on the application of Daubert.64 In Kumho 
Tire, the Supreme Court emphasized the flexibility of the Daubert stan-
 
55 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
56 See id. at 593–94; Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. The Daubert factors 
are: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested, (2) whether 
the expert’s technique or theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) 
whether there is a known or potential rate of error for a particular technique and whether 
there are standards or controls for that technique, and (4) whether the theory or tech-
nique has been generally accepted in the scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
593–94. 
57 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not 
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”). Some other factors that courts have 
found relevant include: (1) whether the research was conducted independent of the litiga-
tion, (2) whether the expert unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to reach 
an unfounded conclusion, (3) whether the expert accounted for obvious alternative ex-
planations, (4) whether the expert employed the same level of intellectual rigor that char-
acterizes the practice of an expert in the field, and (5) whether the relevant field of exper-
tise was known to reach reliable results for the relevant type of expert opinion. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
58 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–96. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
61 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141–53; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139–47. 
62 522 U.S. at 138–39. 
63 Id. at 139. 
64 See 526 U.S. at 150. 
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dard and said that trial court judges should have considerable leeway in 
deciding how to assess and apply the relevant Daubert factors to the facts 
of the case.65 Thus, the Court reaffirmed that a district court judge has 
considerable discretion to evaluate expert testimony.66 
 In sum, these three cases—Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire—
establish the standard for evaluating expert testimony under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.67 In Joiner, the Supreme Court made it clear that 
the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.68 Nonetheless, 
the circuits are not always consistent in how they apply the abuse of dis-
cretion standard.69 
B. Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence on the Abuse of Discretion Standard 
 When reviewing a district court’s Daubert decision, appellate courts 
must consider (1) whether the district court judge used the Daubert fac-
tors and other relevant questions to assess reliability and (2) whether 
the judge’s application of those factors to the expert’s proposed testi-
mony was reasonable or appropriate.70 Typically, appellate courts agree 
that if the district court completely fails to perform a reliability analysis, 
it abuses its discretion.71 Yet, beyond this basic requirement—that the 
court must evaluate expert testimony to some extent—the circuits dif-
fer in how aggressively they scrutinize the trial court judge’s application 
of the Daubert factors to the facts of the case.72 Some appellate courts 
apply abuse of discretion “with teeth,” closely examining the key factors 
the trial court used in making its Rule 702 ruling.73 Other appellate 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. at 152. 
66 See id. 
67 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
68 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
69 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of 
Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 217, 262, 265 (2006). 
70 Id. at 264. 
71 See, e.g., Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); see 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 265. 
72 See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 263–64. 
73 See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 265–66 & n.294 (explaining that courts 
that review Rule 702 rulings “with teeth” closely examine whether the district court made 
an error in judgment—such as ignoring a material factor or improperly relying on a fac-
tor—or made a serious mistake in weighing the factors); see, e.g., Kempner Mobile Elecs., 
Inc. v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 428 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2005); Foster v. Mydas Assocs., 943 
F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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courts give more substantial deference to trial courts when applying the 
abuse of discretion standard.74 
 The Sixth Circuit, prior to its ruling in Tamraz, applied a highly 
deferential abuse of discretion standard when reviewing district courts’ 
Rule 702 rulings.75 Under that standard, the Sixth Circuit reviewed 
whether the trial court performed its gatekeeping role de novo, but 
reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony and its de-
cisions about how to determine admissibility for abuse of discretion.76 
Generally, as long as the trial court performed its Daubert gatekeeping 
role and evaluated the factors appropriately, the Sixth Circuit deferred 
to the trial court’s Daubert analysis.77 
 The abuse of discretion standard of review does not permit an ap-
pellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the district 
court.78 For example, in 2001, the Sixth Circuit, in Hardyman v. Norfolk 
& Western Railway Co., explained that the abuse of discretion standard 
of review is highly deferential.79 The court explained, “[A]n appellate 
court may overturn a lower court’s ruling only if it finds that the ruling 
was arbitrary, unjustifiable, or clearly unreasonable.”80 Furthermore, in sub-
                                                                                                                      
74 See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 266 & nn.295–96 (explaining that appel-
late courts that conduct more limited review tend to focus on whether the trial court made 
a reasonable Rule 702 evaluation and do not evaluate whether the testimony should have 
been admitted); see, e.g., Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929–30 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 267 (6th Cir. 2001). 
75 See Ky. Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 588 F.3d 908, 
915–18 (6th Cir. 2009); Early v. Toyota Motor Corp., 277 F. App’x 581, 585–86 (6th Cir. 
2008); Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 267. 
76 Tharo Sys., Inc. v. Cab Produkttechnik GMBH & Co. KG, 196 F. App’x 366, 373–74 
(6th Cir. 2006) (finding no abuse of discretion when the district court fulfilled its gate-
keeping role). 
77 See, e.g., Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915; Early, 277 F. App’x at 585–86. 
78 See In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528 (6th Cir. 2008); Hardyman, 
243 F.3d at 267. 
79 See 243 F.3d at 267. In Hardyman, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court 
abused its discretion, explaining that “the rationale of the district court did not justify ex-
clusion of Plaintiff’s expert testimony.” See id. The circuit court found that the district 
court judge had first determined that the experts’ proffered method of testimony, differ-
ential diagnosis, was an acceptable method of determining causation. Id. at 261. Despite 
the fact that the experts were testifying using an acceptable method, the district court ex-
cluded their testimony, insisting on more specific studies. See id. at 265. Upon review, the 
circuit court concluded that this requirement would essentially foreclose plaintiffs from 
recovering from their employers unless their specific job had been the subject of a na-
tional, epidemiological study. See id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district 
court abused its discretion by essentially rejecting the well-established diagnostic method 
of differential diagnosis without reason. See id. at 261–67. 
80 Id. at 267 (emphasis added) (quoting Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 
794 F.2d 1139, 1148 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
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sequent opinions, the Sixth Circuit adhered to this highly deferential 
abuse of discretion standard.81 
 Generally, the Sixth Circuit would uphold a district court’s Rule 
702 decision if the court made its decision after carefully reviewing the 
record and the evidence proffered, determining whether the district 
court performed a gatekeeping function by conducting a reasonable 
Daubert inquiry.82 If it was satisfied that the trial court had conducted a 
careful Daubert review and rendered a decision based on reasonable 
factors, the Court of Appeals would not conduct a more specific review 
of the record to determine whether the trial court judge had made the 
correct decision.83 For example, in 2008, in Early v. Toyota Motor Corp., 
the Sixth Circuit noted that the standard of review was highly deferen-
tial and that it would only find an abuse of discretion when it was firmly 
convinced that a mistake had been made.84 In Early, the court upheld 
the district court’s decision excluding an expert’s opinion as unreliable 
because it noted that the district court “carefully considered” some of 
the relevant Daubert factors, such as the lack of testing and specific ex-
pertise underlying the expert’s opinion.85 Therefore, the appellate 
court concluded that the district court had properly fulfilled its gate-
keeping function.86 
 A district court abuses its discretion, however, if it bases its ruling 
on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of 
the evidence.87 The Sixth Circuit articulated this standard in 2009, in 
Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing, 
when it again affirmed the highly deferential abuse of discretion stan-
dard.88 Because the district court assessed the evidence with reference 
to several of the Daubert factors, the Kentucky Speedway court held that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion.89 
 Thus, the Sixth Circuit had long established a highly deferential 
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing district courts’ evidentiary rul-
ings.90 In its review, the Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the trial 
court’s actions in conducting a Daubert review to determine whether it 
                                                                                                                      
81 See, e.g., Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915–18; Early, 277 F. App’x at 585–86. 
82 See, e.g., Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915–18; Early, 277 F. App’x at 585–86. 
83 See Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915, Early, 277 F. App’x at 585–86. 
84 See 277 F. App’x at 585. 
85 Id. at 586. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. 
88 See 588 F.3d at 915. 
89 See id. at 918. 
90 See Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 794 F.2d at 1148. 
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performed its gatekeeping role.91 Once the appeals court was satisfied 
that the trial court fulfilled its gatekeeping function, it would affirm the 
trial courts’ decision on whether or not to admit an expert’s testimony.92 
III. Tamraz: The Sixth Circuit Stretches the Abuse of 
Discretion Standard 
 In Tamraz, the Sixth Circuit arguably reached the correct decision 
in holding that Dr. Carlini’s testimony did not meet the requirements of 
scientific knowledge under Rule 702.93 Yet, in its effort to correctly apply 
the Daubert requirements to Dr. Carlini’s testimony, the court stretched 
the bounds of its reviewing authority.94 Further, in doing so, the court 
may have opened the door for appellate courts to review district courts’ 
evidentiary rulings more aggressively.95 Thus, to adhere to their proper 
role when reviewing Rule 702 rulings, appellate courts should be aware 
of the inherent tension between ensuring compliance with the Rules of 
Evidence and remaining within their reviewing authority.96 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Is Consistent with the Policy of Daubert 
 The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Tamraz—that Dr. Carlini’s testimony 
was speculative and thus did not satisfy Rule 702—was consistent with 
both the law and policy behind Daubert.97 First, in Daubert, the Court 
explained that Rule 702 requires that the foundation of an expert’s tes-
timony be “knowledge.”98 And, knowledge “connotes more than sub-
jective belief or unsupported speculation.”99 Furthermore, in Joiner, the 
Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s exclusion of evidence on 
grounds that it was too speculative.100 A court may do so if “there is 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915–16. 
92 See id. at 915; Early, 277 F. App’x at 585; Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 267. 
93 See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 678 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. 
Evid. 702. 
94 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 
669–72. 
95 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 669–72. 
96 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that appellate courts 
must review Rule 702 rulings for abuse of discretion); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (explaining 
that the district court judge must function as a gatekeeper); Fed R. Evid. 702. 
97 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 675–76. 
98 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
99 Id. Furthermore, the advisory committee’s note to Rule 702 explains that the trial 
judge must ensure that the proffered expert testimony is not speculative. See Fed. R. Evid. 
702 advisory committee’s note. 
100 See 522 U.S. at 146. 
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simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.”101 
 In addition, to fulfill the underlying purpose of Daubert—to estab-
lish a standard of evidentiary reliability for expert testimony—experts 
should not be allowed to speculate as to the cause of a plaintiff’s dis-
ease.102 Speculative expert testimony has the propensity to mislead a 
jury and lead to unfair results.103 Although medical experts may be well 
qualified to diagnose a disease, they may not have a sound basis to give 
an opinion about causation.104 As the Supreme Court in Daubert ex-
plained, “Conjectures . . . are of little use, however, in the project of 
reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment—often of great 
consequence—about a particular set of events in the past.”105 Thus, the 
requirement that experts not be permitted to speculate is well-
established, and the district court in Tamraz arguably did abuse its dis-
cretion by admitting a doctor’s hypothesis that was not sufficiently 
tested or grounded in scientific knowledge.106 
B. The Sixth Circuit Opens the Door for More Aggressive Review  
of Daubert Rulings 
 Although the Sixth Circuit furthered the policy behind Daubert, 
the Tamraz court may have exceeded its authority to review the district 
court’s Rule 702 ruling by failing to explain the precise manner in 
which the district court abused its discretion.107 In prior cases, the Sixth 
Circuit would typically review Daubert rulings with great deference.108 
Under that deferential standard, the court only reversed a district court 
                                                                                                                      
101 See id. (explaining that district courts may properly decline to admit opinion evi-
dence that is connected to existing data only by the unproven assertion of the expert). 
102 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 251. 
103 See id. 
104 See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at 251. 
105 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (explaining that, although open debate is essential to sci-
entific analysis, scientific conjectures are not appropriate in the law, which must resolve 
disputes quickly and finally). 
106 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 670–72; Goebel v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000). 
107 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 680; Tamraz v. BOC Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2008 WL 
2796726, at *8 n.58 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2008), rev’d, 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The 
Court does not recite in this opinion all of the substantial evidence supporting the propo-
sition that exposure to manganese in welding fumes can, at least in some circumstances, 
cause Manganese-Induces Parkinsonism . . . .”). 
108 See, e.g., Ky. Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Assoc. of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 588 F.3d 
908, 915–18 (6th Cir. 2009); Early v. Toyota Motor Corp., 277 F. App’x 581, 585–86 (6th 
Cir. 2008); Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 267 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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when it clearly erred as a matter of law or failed to conduct appropriate 
Daubert hearings or reviews.109 
 Yet, in Tamraz, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, even 
though the district court had conducted extensive hearings, spending 
three weeks assessing the reliability and methodologies of the proffered 
expert opinion testimony.110 The district court chose to admit Dr. Car-
lini’s testimony, explaining that, in its view, his testimony satisfied the 
requirements of Daubert.111 Prior to trial, the judge explained, “I see 
nothing about [Dr. Carlini’s] methodology that is either flawed or in-
consistent with the very diagnostic methods that the other experts in 
this case, both the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ experts alike, have 
used and have described as appropriate diagnostic methods.”112 Fur-
thermore, as the dissent argued in Tamraz, Dr. Carlini’s testimony about 
the connection between manganese and Parkinson’s Disease was the 
subject of valid scientific debate at the time.113 Therefore, Dr. Carlini’s 
testimony satisfied at least one Daubert factor.114 
 Accordingly, the district court’s finding was not “arbitrary, unjustifi-
able, or clearly unreasonable.”115 Indeed, the circuit court engaged in a 
de novo-like standard of review, holding that testimony offered was not 
scientific evidence because it was too speculative, yet failed to point out 
exactly how the district court abused its discretion.116 Accordingly, in re-
versing the district court’s decision to admit Dr. Carlini’s testimony, the 
Sixth Circuit broadened the abuse of discretion standard, allowing appel-
late courts to take a more active role in evaluating expert testimony.117 
                                                                                                                      
109 See, e.g., Ky. Speedway, 588 F.3d at 915–18; Early, 277 F. App’x at 585–86; Hardyman, 
243 F.3d at 267; see also supra notes 72–85 and accompanying text (presenting an overview 
of the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the abuse of discretion standard). 
110 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 678; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Tamraz, 620 F.3d 665 
(No. 10–1122), 2011 WL 882177, at *8. 
111 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 679 (Boyce, J., dissenting) (referring to the district court 
judge’s denial of defendants’ motion to exclude parts of the testimony). 
112 Id. (discussing the extensive trial record and noting testimony given at trial). The 
district court judge further noted that the defendants would have fair grounds to attack 
Dr. Carlini’s fairly unusual diagnosis, but she explained that that goes to the weight, not 
the admissibility, of his testimony. Id. 
113 Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 683. 
114 Id. One of the Daubert factors is “whether the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication.” 509 F.3d at 593. 
115 Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 267; see Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 680–81 (Boyce, J., dissenting). 
116 See Tamraz, 620 F.3d at 679 (Boyce, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately, while paying lip 
service to the correct standard, the majority actually applies a de novo standard of review.”). 
117 See id. at 684 (arguing that when the state of the science is difficult to determine, 
appellate courts should defer to the district court, which heard the evidence and can make 
decisions in context); Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 267. 
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 Daubert imposes on trial courts a duty to ensure that any expert 
testimony admitted in a case is reliable and relevant.118 Trial court 
judges must carefully screen all proffered expert testimony because 
such testimony can strongly influence juries.119 As the Supreme Court 
recognized in Daubert, expert evidence can be both powerful and mis-
leading because it is often difficult for a lay juror to evaluate.120 Because 
experts, unlike lay witnesses, are permitted to reach conclusions on the 
ultimate issue in the case, it is crucial that district court judges be al-
lowed to fulfill their duties as gatekeepers to ensure that experts’ con-
clusions flow reasonably from their methodologies.121 
Conclusion 
 In Tamraz, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court had abused 
its discretion in permitting a physician’s testimony that manganese ex-
posure caused the plaintiff’s parkinsonism. Although the court likely 
arrived at the proper decision in this case, by failing to articulate the 
specific manner in which the district court abused its discretion, the 
court opened the door for it and other appellate courts to take a more 
aggressive role in evaluating the admissibility in expert testimony. 
Nonetheless, trial courts, because they enjoy the benefit of the full evi-
dentiary record, remain in the best position to make admissibility de-
terminations. Therefore, circuit courts should adhere to an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. If a reviewing court finds that a district 
court abused its discretion, the court should carefully explain how the 
district court judge’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. 
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